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11 Introduction
Manipulation of government ￿nances for the bene￿t of narrowly de￿ned groups￿special-
interest politics, for short￿is usually thought to be limited to the part of the budget over which
politicians exercise discretion in the short run, such as earmarks. Examples of such tactical
redistribution include regulatory or ￿scal favors for special interests, such as when particular
industries or districts receive public construction projects and government jobs. In contrast,
rules-based or programmatic redistribution￿carried out using income taxes and the social wel-
fare system￿is considered to be relatively stable over time and driven by general-interest pol-
itics, which pits the economic interests of large groups of voters against each other (Dixit and
Londregan 1996; Persson and Tabellini 2000). Whether in practice the scope of tactical redis-
tribution is really limited to discretionary parts of the budget is an important question from both
theoretical and policy perspectives. Perhaps surprisingly, however, little is known about this
issue because the voluminous empirical literature on redistributive politics￿discussed in Sec-
tion 2 below￿has focused almost exclusively on discretionary government spending, implicitly
assuming that rules-based programs are implemented without regard to special interests.1
In this paper, I examine whether a rules-based transfer program in Brazil, the Fundo de Par-
ticipa￿ªo dos Munic￿pios (FPM), which supposedly makes payments to municipal governments
exclusively on the basis of population size, was manipulated to favor special interests.2 The
design of the revenue-sharing mechanism considered here is similar to the General Revenue
Sharing program used in the US from 1972 to 1986, and is common in many other federations
around the world today.3 These programs bypass the annual budget process and redistribute a
substantial part of national tax revenues to local governments based on objective criteria, such
as population size. While the explicit goals of such revenue-sharing mechanisms are many, an
important common feature is that they aim to redistribute income from rich to poor communi-
ties, irrespective of the political characteristics of the community. Ideological alignment with
1Among relatively recent contributions are the following: Ames (1995a, 1995b, 2001), Levitt and Snyder (1995),
Schady (2000), Case (2001), Dahlberg and Johansson (2002), Finan (2003), Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006), Khemani
(2007), SolØ-OllØ and Sorribas-Navarro (2007), Arulampalam, Dasgupta, Dhillon, and Dutta (2009).
2Municipalities are the lowest level of government in Brazil (below the federal and state governments). The paper
refers to counties, communities, and municipalities interchangeably.
3Other major federations include Canada, Germany and India (Boadway and Shah 2007).
2the party in control of the central government should play no role in the allocation of resources
undersuchprograms. Indeed, oneoftheobjectivesofrules-basedprogramsistopreventtactical
redistribution.
The ￿rst result documented here is that the of￿cial population estimates that went into the
FPM transfer allocation formula for the year 1991 were manipulated, as evidenced by their
discontinuous distribution around several population thresholds that determine the amount of
transfers received by a municipality. This is in stark contrast to the distribution of census 1991
municipality population and to the distributions of of￿cial estimates from prior years, which
are all smooth around the same thresholds. The 1991 manipulation led to many municipali-
ties receiving higher amounts of transfers than was warranted by their population and resulted
in economically important funding differentials. Municipalities that located above the various
population cutoffs in 1991 received additional transfers of about US$ 3.6 million on average
over the entire decade of the 1990s because the 1991 allocations were subsequently grandfa-
thered.4 For small local governments, the annual transfer differential amounted to about 15%
of the public budget.
In the second step of the analysis, I evaluate which￿if any￿of several theories about
special-interests politics are consistent with the observed program manipulation. According
to Cox and McCubbins (1986), a conservative central government, such as the one in Brazil un-
der president Collor from 1990 to 1992, should target core-support conservative municipalities
if the electoral response to economic favors among opposition or uncommitted municipalities
relative to core-support municipalities is more uncertain and if the central government is risk
averse. Similarly, core-support conservative municipalities should be targeted if the central
government attempts to buy turnout of existing but unmobilized supporters, instead of votes
(Nichter 2008). In contrast, communities with many non-ideological "swing" voters should
be targeted if parties are equally effective in delivering favors to voters across communities
(Lindbeck and Weibull 1987, Dixit and Londregan 1996).
In order to discriminate between the core-support and swing-voter targeting predictions,
4The cumulative difference in FPM transfers over the period from 1991 to 1999 was about R$ 5 million in 2008
prices. The Real/$ purchasing power parity exchange rate in 2005 was about 1.36 (World Bank 2008).
3I use a non-linear speci￿cation in the municipality-level right-wing vote share￿de￿ned as
the electoral support for right-wing parties in the preceding elections of the C￿mara Federal
dos Deputados (the Federal Chamber of Deputies).5 Right-wing parties in Brazil are readily
identi￿ed￿despite the fact that the party system became very fragmented with the transition
to democracy￿because during the dictatorship period the system was essentially a two-party
system, and right-wing parties can for the most part be traced back to the party of the mili-
tary government.6 Under the assumption that the right-wing vote share captures the ideological
bias of the municipality, a positive relationship with ￿ctitiously high population would indicate
core-support targeting, while a non-linear, inverted-U, relationship would be consistent with
swing-voter targeting at the expense of opposition or conservative core-support municipalities.7
Consistent with swing-voter targeting by the conservative central government, I ￿nd that
communities with roughly equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares had a 16 percentage
points higher chance to get favorable population estimates relative to opposition municipalities,
and an 8 percentage point higher chance compared to conservative core-support municipali-
ties. In contrast, there is no evidence of swing- or core-voter targeting in the 1985 population
estimates￿the last estimates made under the military government that had set up the revenue-
sharing mechanism in 1965￿suggesting that the military government had indeed played by its
own rules.8 The evidence thus suggests that, although the grand redistribution scheme discussed
here was shielded from tactical redistribution during the dictatorship, the same program became
subject to special-interest politics after the transition to democracy.
Recent theoretical models of special-interest politics in federal systems, such as Brazil, have
made further predictions regarding the allocation of intergovernmental transfers, and these
depend on the extent of goodwill leakage. Speci￿cally, if voters give enough credit for im-
5To be precise, right-wing consists of the following political parties: PFL, PDS, PTB, PDC, PL, and PRN. See Table
3 for full party names.
6Moreover, the electoral coalitions for the 1990 race for federal deputies I observe in my data are consistent with the
de￿nition of right-wing adopted here. As a robustness check I also include minor right-wing parties such as the PSD,
PTR, PSC and PST to de￿ne the right-wing vote share. See Table 3 for full party names.
7I am grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting this approach. Previous drafts had used interparty fragmenta-
tion as an explanatory variable and found that it is positively correlated with favorable population estimates. Although
consistent with the results presented here (equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares imply high fragmentation)
interparty fragmentation is much harder to interpret than the right-wing vote share since fragmentation might be high
for other reasons as well, perhaps because the number of political parties is high for example.
8Whether special-interest politics was already at play during the 1986-1990 Congress, the ￿rst under the new demo-
cratic regime, I cannot tell because electoral data from that period are not readily available.
4provements in their economic conditions to the lower levels of government that turn funds into
public services, then allocating grants to non-aligned (non-right-wing) lower levels of govern-
ments might actually harm the re-election prospects of the central government (or the election
prospects of local conservative parties). If goodwill leakage is suf￿ciently "large," non-aligned
lower level governments might therefore be expected to receive less transfers than those that are
aligned with the right-wing central government (Arulampalam, Dasgupta, Dhillon and Dutta,
2008; Khemani 2007; SolØ-OllØ and Sorribas-Navarro 2007).
Although for the general budget-support transfers considered here, leakage is likely to be
relatively large (at least compared to project-speci￿c central government grants), the results
suggest a more complex picture because the conditional expectation functions for aligned and
non-aligned lower-level governments cross twice. Swing-voter targeting was in fact driven en-
tirely by states with non-right-wing governors and by municipalities with non-right-wing may-
ors. Among aligned states and municipalities, there is no statistical evidence of core-support
or swing-voter targeting. Although statistically the evidence against a common strategy across
states and municipalities is not very strong, the pattern suggests that the conservative central
government was attempting to bring non-ideological voters in non-aligned lower-level govern-
ments into the fold.
A ￿nal set of predictions relates to legislative coalition-building in presidential systems.
Ames (1995a, 1995b, 2001), among others, argues that presidential coalition-building strate-
gies in Brazil are at least in part based on federal deputies trading votes for discretionary grants
from the federal executive. Such grants necessarily ￿ow to individual local governments, how-
ever, while deputies compete for votes in their entire state. Any given county thus contributes
votes to multiple deputies, which makes it dif￿cult for any one of them to claim credit for the
federal ￿nancial support he helped to attract. This is particularly true for the unrestricted bud-
get transfers that are the focus of this analysis￿as opposed to project-speci￿c grants for which
credit-claiming is relatively easier.
Amesdiscussestheincentivespresidentsandfederaldeputiesfaceundersuchcircumstances.
On the one hand, he argues that deputies are more likely to trade votes for grants with the exec-
5utive when they dominate the municipality vote or at least face limited competition from within
their own party, because this makes credit-claiming for the deputy easier. On the other hand,
Ames argues that high levels of political competition might re￿ect weak ideological preferences
and a community susceptible to particularistic bene￿ts, provided that the deputy ￿nds a way to
claim political credit, for example through an alliance with the local executive. The predicted
effect of having a municipality- or coalition-dominant deputy in a given municipality on the
likelihood of striking a deal with the executive is thus ambiguous. Empirically, I ￿nd some evi-
dence that communities with a municipality-dominant deputy were less likely to receive overly
favorable population estimates compared to communities where no deputy dominated the mu-
nicipality or coalition vote.
In sum, these ￿ndings suggest that the exclusive focus on discretionary transfers in the ex-
tant empirical literature on special-interest politics may understate the true scope of tactical
redistribution that is going on under programmatic disguise. The results are consistent with
swing-voter targeting by the conservative central government and there is some evidence of
legislative coalition-building between the executive and deputies in electorally fragmented mu-
nicipalities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses existing empirical
work on redistributive politics. Section 3 presents institutional background on the revenue-
sharing mechanism between the federal and local governments in Brazil and provides evidence
of program manipulation in 1991. Section 4 presents the theoretical framework as well as em-
pirically testable hypotheses given the political and institutional environment in Brazil around
1990. Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 gives details on the estimation approach. Es-
timation results are presented in Section 7. The ￿nal section concludes with a discussion of
limitations and extensions.
2 Existing empirical work on redistributive politics
Many empirical studies have found that politicians tend to reward their core constituents, as
measured by the proportion of votes in a district that go to the party in power at the center.
6Levitt and Snyder (1995) show that the Democratic vote share is an important predictor of the
amount of federal spending across congressional districts for the period 1975-1981, when the
federal government was under control of the Democratic party, but not during the 1981-1990
period of divided government. Case (2001) provides evidence of a positive relationship between
commune level voting with the central government party in a 1994 constitutional referendum
and the subsequent receipt of block grants in Albania. Schady (2000) likewise shows that
expenditures by the Peruvian Social Fund over the period 1991-1995 were in part targeted at
communities that had helped elect the incumbent government. Using variation in party control
of U.S. state governments across states and over time, Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006) also ￿nd
that the distribution of intergovernmental transfers to local (county) governments was skewed
towards loyal constituents.
Some studies have tested explicitly whether transfers are targeted at swing communities.
Wright (1974) ￿nds that states exhibiting higher variability in Democratic vote shares for Presi-
dential elections received more federal spending and more work-relief jobs. Case (2001) shows
that block grants were also targeted at communes that were relatively swing (close to 50% vot-
ing with the central government party on the referendum). Similarly, Schady (2000) also ￿nds
that central government funds were targeted at communities where support for the government
in previous elections was close to 50%. Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) provide evidence that
the central government in Sweden targeted transfers towards regions where the last center gov-
ernment election was close or the estimated proportion of swing voters was high. They ￿nd no
evidence that core-constituents were favored. In contrast, Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006) ￿nd
no evidence that parties reward counties where partisan vote shares are close to 50% Demo-
cratic and 50% Republican or where the volatility of the Democratic vote share in the past was
high.
A number of recent papers test whether center-local alignment matters for the allocation
of intergovernmental grants. ADDD (2008) show for India that project-speci￿c discretionary
grants from the central government are more likely to ￿ow to aligned state governments over
the period 1974-1997, but only in those states with a high proportion of close constituency
7elections. Khemani (2007) ￿nds that over essentially the same time period, aligned Indian states
received more general purpose discretionary grants, irrespective of the closeness of previous
state legislature elections. Finally, the results in SolØ-OllØ and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) suggest
that over the period 1993-2003, partisan alignment had a sizeable positive effect on the amount
of grants received by Spanish municipalities.
A number of empirical papers deal with special-interest redistributive politics speci￿cally
in Brazil. Ames (1995a) demonstrates that federal deputies in the 1987-1990 legislature were
more likely to make amendments to the national budget in municipalities where their individual
vote share in the previous election was high. He also ￿nds that deputies target vulnerable
municipalities, that is, municipalities where incumbent deputies retired, in-migration was high
and interparty and intraparty fragmentation were high. Similarly, Finan (2003) investigates
federal deputies’ amendments to the national budget over the legislative cycle 1995-1998, and
￿nds that they tend to reward municipalities for past electoral support. Arretche and Rodden
(2004) ￿nd that those states which provided more votes in past presidential elections received
more intergovernmental transfers over the period 1991-2000.
There is substantive evidence that Brazilian presidents use public resources to garner leg-
islative support. Ames (1995b) investigates the determinants of voting by federal deputies in
Brazil’s National Constituent Assembly (ANC) of 1987-1988 and on a set of president Collor’s
emergency decrees in 1990. He ￿nds that pork in the form of intergovernmental transfers, li-
cences granted and meetings with ministers is an important determinant of deputy voting behav-
ior. Ames (2001) also examines the allocation of project-speci￿c grants to local governments
in Brazil over the period 1986-1994 and ￿nds indirect evidence of presidential vote-buying. In
particular, he ￿nds that both the extent of party fragmentation and deputy party af￿liation are
important determinants of federal project-speci￿c transfers.
Similarly, Arretche and Rodden (2004) ￿nd that the spatial allocation of federal transfers to
individualstatesinBrazilovertheperiod1991-2000dependsontheextentoflegislativesupport
for the executive as measured by the share of each state’s delegation to the national legislature
that belongs to the president’s legislative coalition. While the authors interpret their result
8as evidence of executive-legislative bargaining, it is also consistent with models of unilateral
optimization by the central government executive, such as the one outlined in Section 4 below.
3 Institutional background
In this section, I ￿rst describe the economic importance, mechanics and origins of the fed-
eral revenue-sharing fund for municipal governments in Brazil. Next, I give details on the
forecasting procedure for local population estimates in inter-censal years. I then document a
manipulation of the program that occurred with the 1991 population estimates and show that
this manipulation substantively increased the number of municipalities that were over-classi￿ed
relative to transfer brackets warranted by census population. I also show that the manipulation
had economically signi￿cant effects on the distribution of revenue-sharing funds. Finally, I dis-
cuss why the effects of the manipulation extended over the entire decade of the 1990s to the
present day.
3.1 Importance, mechanics and origins of revenue-sharing in Brazil
Intergovernmental transfers ￿nance most of local government spending on primary education,
primary health care, housing and urban infrastructure, and local public transportation in Brazil.
Over the period of the 1990s, total government revenue in Brazil was about 28% of GDP,
of which municipalities collected about 5%. At the same time, local governments managed
about 16% of public resources. Intergovernmental transfers to local governments therefore
represented about 3.08% of GDP. The most important among these transfers is the Fundo de
Participa￿ªo dos Munic￿pios (FPM), a constitutionally guaranteed and largely unconditional
revenue-sharing grant funded by federal income and industrial products taxes.9 The FPM grant
alone accounted for about 50% of revenue in small to medium sized local governments.
According to the national tax code (Decree 1881/81), transfer amounts depend on municipal-
ity population in a discontinuous fashion. More speci￿cally, based on municipality population
9Federal Constitution of Brazil, 1988, Art. 159 Ib. The one condition is that municipalities must spend 25 percent of
the transfers on education (Art. 212). This constraint is usually considered non-binding, in that municipalities typically
spend about 20% of their total revenue on education. It is not clear how this provision was enforced in practice, since
there is no clear de￿nition of education expenditures and accounting information provided by local governments was
not systematically veri￿ed.
9estimates, pope, municipalities are assigned a coef￿cient k D k.pope/, where k.:/ is the step
function shown in Table 1. For municipalities with up to 10’188 inhabitants, the coef￿cient is
0.6; from 10’189 to 13’584 inhabitants, the coef￿cient is 0.8; and so forth. There is a total of
18 population brackets and although the population thresholds were supposed to evolve with
population growth in Brazil, they remained unchanged since 1966, as further detailed below.
The coef￿cient k.pope
mst/ determines the share of FPM resources available for state s that are
distributed to municipality m in year t. The amount of transfers to state s in turn depends on a
percentage fs of federal tax collection earmarked for revenue-sharing in year t, revt. The state
shares are determined in the constitution and have remained unchanged since their introduc-
tion in 1989.10 FPMmst is the amount transferred to municipality m in state s during year t









Equation (1) makes it clear that local population estimates should be the only determinant of
cross-municipality variation in FPM funding in a given state.
Before proceeding it is worth discussing why politicians would choose to allocate resources
based on objective criteria, such as population, rather than use discretion? The answer to this
question lies in the political agenda of the military dictatorship which came to power in 1964.
As detailed by Hagopian (1996), one of the major objectives of the military was to wrest control
over resources from the traditional political elite and at the same time to depoliticize public ser-
vice provision. The creation of a revenue-sharing fund for the munic￿pios based on an objective
criterion of need, population, was part of this greater agenda. It re￿ected an attempt to break
with the clientelistic practice of the traditional elite, which manipulated public resources to the
bene￿t of narrowly de￿ned constituencies.
The reason for allocating resources by brackets, i.e. as a step function of population as in
Decree 1881/81, is less clear. One explanation could be that compared to a linear schedule, for
example, the bracket design mutes incentives for local of￿cials at the interior of the bracket to
10Supplementary Law no 62/1989 and Decision no 242/1990 of the Federal Court of Accounts. The state shares fs
correspond to the shares of each state in the total population of Brazil according to the 1991 census.
10tinker with their population ￿gures or to contest the accuracy of the estimates in order to get
more transfers. A related question is where the exact cutoffs come from￿that is, why 10’188,
13’584, 16’980, etc.? While I was unable to trace the origin of these cutoffs precisely, I know
roughly how they came about. The initial legislation from 1967 created cutoffs at multiples
of 2’000 and stipulated that these should be updated proportionally with population growth
in Brazil.11 The cutoffs were thus presumably updated twice, once with the census of 1970
and then with the census of 1980, which explains the "odd" numbers. It is noteworthy that
the thresholds are still equidistant from one another, the distance being 6’792 for the ￿rst 7
cutoffs (except for the second cutoff which lies exactly halfway in between the ￿rst and the
third cutoffs).
3.2 The forecasting procedure for local population estimates
According to equation (1), municipality population is the key determinant of this revenue-
sharing mechanism. However, exact municipality population ￿gures are only available for cen-
sus years or years when a national population count is conducted. For all other years, of￿cial
population estimates are produced by the National Statistical Agency, IBGE.12 Prior to 1989
these estimates were updated only in years ending with the number 5. Beginning in 1989 the
estimates were updated on a yearly basis. The currently used forecasting procedure is based on
a top-down approach that ensures consistency of estimates for lower level units (municipalities)
with the higher levels (states and the country as a whole) (IBGE, 2002).
First, IBGE produces a population estimate for Brazil, pope
t , based on estimated birth rates,
mortality and net migration for Brazil. Individual states are then assigned their share of the
national estimate, pope
st, in proportion to past state level census population numbers. Munic-
ipalities within a given state are grouped by quartile of both census population levels and past
population growth between census years and growing municipalities are separated from shrink-
ing municipalities. Each of these 20 groups of municipalities is then assigned its share of the
state population estimate, pope
jst; proportional to past group level census population. Finally,
11Supplementary Law No. 35, 1967, Art. 1, Paragraphs 2 and 4.
12Supplementary Law no 59/1988, Art. 91, Paragraph 3.
11each municipality within each group is assigned its population estimate, pope
mjst; based on
past municipality level census information. The speci￿c formula for municipality population
estimates is as follows:
pope
mjst D .popmjs80=popjs80/[ajs pope






bjs D popjs80 ￿ ajs pops80
Accordingtoequation(2)localpopulationforecastsareessentiallyacontinuousfunctionofpast
census information and state level population projections. This top-down procedure ensures the
consistency of estimates for lower level units (municipalities) with the higher levels (states and











Since local population estimates directly determine funding levels, it is important to verify
whether they are indeed derived from this forecasting procedure. My replication attempt sug-
gests that, as a ￿rst approximation, 1989 of￿cial population estimates are indeed consistent with
the forecasting procedure described above (results available on request).
3.3 Evidence on manipulation of population estimates
The ￿rst empirical fact established in this paper is that the tight link between formula-driven
predictions and of￿cial estimates broke down over the next two years.13 This point is best
demonstrated with the use of histograms for 1989 of￿cial estimates, for the 1991 of￿cial esti-
mates and for 1991 census population.14 Figures 1 and 2 show that, while the distribution of
1989 of￿cial estimates is smooth at the thresholds, the distribution of 1991 of￿cial estimates
exhibits gaps immediately below the thresholds determining transfer brackets and even more
131990 estimates already exhibit some irregularities but the 1991 manipulation is much more pronounced and pro-
duced more lasting effects as further discussed in Section 3.4 below.
14The bin-width in these histograms is 566, which ensures that the various cutoffs coincide with bin limits￿that is,
no bin counts observations from both sides of any cutoff.
12obvious spikes immediately above those cutoffs. The histogram for 1991 of￿cial estimates ac-
tually understates the discontinuity of the density around the cutoffs because the spikes occur at
speci￿c points on the support.15 The total number of municipalities that were placed on any one
of these bunching points is 1870, which represents 42% of the municipalities receiving FPM
transfers at the time.
Figure 3 makes it clear that these gaps (to the left) and spikes (to the right) of the thresholds
do not re￿ect 1991 census population. While I was not able to con￿rm with IBGE what forecast
model they were using in 1991, it seems clear that government of￿cials did not rely exclusively
on some variant of the forecast procedure outlined above, which is essentially a continuous
function of past census information and population projections. The discontinuous distribution
of population estimates is thus almost surely the result of an adjustment which went beyond the
mechanical application of the forecasting procedure.
The reasons for this manipulation or adjustment of population estimates are less clear. For
example, it is conceivable that bureaucrats used some administrative rule to determine which
estimates to revise. Of￿cials were likely more averse to underestimate a municipality relative
to a given threshold than overestimating it because underestimated municipalities were much
more likely to appeal against IBGE’s preliminary population estimates. Although IBGE has the
￿nal authority to determine of￿cial estimates, i.e. there is no external review of IBGE deci-
sions, dealing with municipality complaints involves scarce administrative resources. Bureau-
crats’ attempts to preempt such complaints would explain the curious gaps in the distribution
of estimates just below the thresholds as well as a part of the spikes just above. One sensible
administrative rule would be that all municipalities within a given distance to the next higher
threshold were placed just above the threshold to take account of the uncertainty surrounding
the formula based estimates. The mass of missing municipalities from the gaps to the left of
each threshold is too low to account for the mass on the spikes, however. In other words, IBGE
of￿cials must have bumped up municipalities for other reasons as well.
Alternatively, administrators might have had access to evidence about actual local population
15The exact bunching points are as follows: 10189, 10298, 13730, 17162, 24027, 30891, 37756, 44620, 51484,
61781, 72078, 82375, 92671, 102968, 116697, 130426, 144155, 157884.
13levelsjustifyingselectiverevisionofpopulationestimates. Forexample, somemayorsmayhave
presented IBGE with administrative data, such as local vital and migration statistics indicating
that they were in fact eligible for higher transfers. It is also possible that IBGE used electoral
data from 1988 to reclassify municipalities. If this were the case￿and if the information IBGE
acted upon was more reliable than the predictions from the model￿one would expect that the
numberofcorrectlyclassi￿edmunicipalitiesintermsoftransferbracketsincreasedwiththema-
nipulation. Since populations are known ex post from the 1991 census, I can test whether this is
indeed the case by comparing the classi￿cation performance that arises using the 1991 manip-
ulated estimates to the classi￿cation performance using the 1991 pre-manipulation or ￿rst-pass
population estimates. Such a comparison holds the inherent uncertainty surrounding population
estimates constant and allows a quanti￿cation of the distortion of public funds generated by the
manipulation.
Since I do not observe 1991 pre-manipulation estimates I use the 1989 of￿cial estimates
instead.16 Equation (2) shows that the only information relevant for local population forecasts
that changes between 1989 and 1991 are state-level population estimates. Since these changes
are unlikely to be large from year to year, the resulting classi￿cation error is likely limited. I
focus on the bracket error, de￿ned as the difference between the predicted transfer bracket for
1991, k.pope
m/, and the correct transfer bracket for 1991, based on census local population
(unknown at the time of the forecast), k.popm/:
bracket error D 5 ￿ [k.pope
m/ ￿ k.popm/]
Table 2 shows the distribution of bracket errors under the 1989 of￿cial estimates (which proxies
for 1991 pre-manipulation estimates) and the manipulated 1991 of￿cial estimates. From panels
A and B it is apparent that for bunched municipalities, that is, those located on any of the bunch-
ing points, the manipulation increased the percentage of mis-classi￿ed municipalities (bracket
error 6D 0) from about 51% to about 83%. Even more strikingly, the manipulation shifted the
entire bracket error distribution to the right, moving the percent over-classi￿ed (bracket error >
16I also use the 1989 predicted population estimates discussed above and results are almost identical to those obtained
using the 1989 of￿cial estimates.
140) from 31% to 80%. For non-bunched municipalities, the percentage mis-classi￿ed increased
only slightly from 20% (Panel C) to 21% (Panel D), while the percentage over-classi￿ed in-
creased from 10% to 20%. Overall, the manipulated 1991 of￿cial estimates increased the
number of mis-classi￿ed municipalities from 33% to 48% and the number of over-classi￿ed
municipalities from 19% to 46%.
Theseresultssuggestthattheinformationusedtorevisetheformula-drivenestimateswasnot
a good predictor of actual levels of population in 1991. It is also worth noting that manipulation
may not have been limited to the bunched municipalities since the percentage over-classi￿ed
also increased for the non-bunched municipalities. Similarly, the 1991 manipulation may not
have been an isolated incident. Even prior to 1991 there might have been more subtle manipu-
lations of the program, which left the distribution of population estimates smooth at the cutoffs.
I take up this issue in Section 4 below, where I test whether conditional on non-political munic-
ipality characteristics, political determinants are able to predict of￿cial estimates, both in 1991
and in 1985, the last year of the military government.
3.4 Economic signi￿cance of the manipulation
The 1991 manipulation resulted in economically important transfer differentials. Municipali-
ties that located above a population cutoff in 1991 received additional transfers of about US$
3.6 million on average over the entire decade of the 1990s (and beyond) because coef￿cients
were subsequently grandfathered.17 For small local governments the annual transfer differential
amounted to about 15% of their public budgets. Figure 4 illustrates the persistence of this effect
by showing sample average cumulative FPM transfers over the period 1991-1999 against the
1991 of￿cial population estimate in a given bin.
Grandfathering began in 1992 when all coef￿cients remained virtually unchanged, partly
because census results had not been available by the end of 1991. When census population
estimates were ￿nally released in 1993, the majority of municipalities would have had their
coef￿cients reduced because the law stipulated that the thresholds be adjusted with population
17The cumulative difference in FPM transfers over the period from 1991 to 1999 was about R$ 5 million in 2008
prices. The Real/$ purchasing power parity exchange rate in 2005 was about 1.36 (World Bank 2008).
15growth and these municipalities had grown less than the population average for Brazil. Some
municipalities would have incurred a signi￿cant loss of transfers as a result of this reclassi￿ca-
tion (Brandt 2002).
Another law was approved in April 1993, still by the same congress, which determined that
both coef￿cients and population thresholds were to be maintained without adjustment.18 The
only exception was for municipalities that were subdivided and lost population to newly-created
municipalities. The revision of coef￿cients for these types of municipalities was done according
to the existing population thresholds using the latest census population ￿gures. Underestimated
municipalities’ coef￿cients were updated pursuant to the publication of the census while over-
estimated municipalities’ coef￿cients were not.
In 1996, there was a population count carried out by IBGE and Congress approved another
supplementary law at the end of 1997. It stated that in 1998 all coef￿cients of the FPM were
to remain the same as in 1997.19 From 1999 onwards however, coef￿cients would be based on
the 1996 population count and the grandfathering would be phased out over the next ￿ve years.
In each year, coef￿cients of municipalities that had bene￿ted from the grandfathering would be
reduced by 20% of the excess coef￿cient, the difference between the grandfathered coef￿cient
and that resulting from current population estimates. As a result of the 1997 law, coef￿cients
for ￿scal years from 1999 onwards were increasingly based on current population estimates.
Denoting km as the grandfathered coef￿cient for municipality m, 1[:] as the indicator function
and ￿t as the percentage reduction in the excess coef￿cient km ￿ k.popmt/, coef￿cients are
currently calculated as
kmt D 1[k.popmt/ > km]k.popmt/ C 1[k.popmt/ < km][km ￿ ￿t.km ￿ k.popmt//]
In March 2001 a new supplementary law was enacted in order to postpone full adjustment to
2008.20 The 1991 manipulation thus extends its effects to the present day.
To sum up this section, there is clear evidence that the 1991 of￿cial population estimates
were somehow adjusted or manipulated. The adjustments resulted in economically important
18Supplementary Law no 74/1993.
19Supplementary Law no 91/1997.
20Supplementary Law no 106/2001.
16transfer differentials extending up to the present day because coef￿cients were grandfathered.
The fact that the manipulation of municipality population estimates documented above sig-
ni￿cantly increased the number of mis-classi￿ed municipalities casts doubts on technocratic
explanations. The remainder of the paper turns to political explanations of the program manip-
ulation.
4 Theoretical framework and predictions
4.1 Theoretical framework
This section presents a simple model of central government resource allocation across munici-
palities, borrowed from Arulampalam, Dasgupta, Dhillon and Dutta, henceforth ADDD (2008),
and similar to models by SolØ-OllØ and Sorribas-Navarro (2007) and Khemani (2007). There
are two key predictions from these models: ￿rst that a vote-maximizing central government
incumbent will favor "swing" municipalities￿those with a high proportion of non-ideological
voters￿and second, that the incumbent may skew ￿scal transfers in favor of aligned lower-level
governments if credit-claiming is suf￿ciently dif￿cult, that is, if the implementing lower-level
government gets suf￿ciently high partial credit for turning funding into public services.
There are two parties, L and R, and two levels of government, center and local. The central
government incumbent party R, decides on the allocation of transfers and is assumed to care
about its own re-election.21 There is a set of municipalities SR where the local incumbent party
is R; and a set of municipalities SL where the local incumbent party is L: Transfers from the
center to each of M municipalities ￿nance local public services valued by voters. Actual service
provision is done by the local government and imperfectly informed voters may not perceive
perfectly that the R party is the source of the grants or they may credit the local party for turning
extra funding into public services. As a result, the goodwill generated by these transfers is likely
shared between incumbent parties at both levels of government. Let ￿ 2 [0;1] denote the share
of goodwill from per capita transfers that accrues to the central incumbent. ￿ is known by the
central government and assumed exogenous. For the kind of transfers considered here, given
21The same results obtain if the central government incumbent is assumed to care about election of aligned parties at
the local level (ADDD 2008).
17as general budget support, ￿ is likely to be relatively low, at least compared to project-speci￿c
central government grants.
Within each municipality m, there is a continuum of voters of mass Nm who may differ in
their ideologies. A voter j, located at X j on the ideology spectrum [X; X] has preference X j
for party L over party R. X j is private information while the cumulative distribution function
of X in municipality m, denoted 8m.X/; is common knowledge. 80
m.X/ is strictly positive and
continuous for all X: For simplicity, X D ￿X, so that the midpoint is 0.
Voters in each municipality vote on the basis of ideology and economic bene￿ts generated
by grants. Consider a voter j in municipality m 2 SR which has received per capita grant gm
from the center. Party R has received a goodwill of U.gm/, with U.0/ D 0; U0.gm/ > 0;
U00.gm/ < 0 and so voter j votes for party R iff:
U.gm/ ￿ X j ￿ 0 (3)
and votes for party L otherwise. In contrast, in a municipality governed by party L; goodwill
is split between the two parties: party R gets ￿U.gm/ while party L gets .1 ￿ ￿/U.gm/: Voter
j will vote for party R iff:
￿U.gm/ ￿ .1 ￿ ￿/U.gm/ ￿ X j ￿ 0 (4)
Theinequalities(3)and(4)generatecutpoints, X.gm; R/and X.gm;￿; L/foreachmunicipality
suchthatavoterlocatedat X j votesforparty R iff X j ￿ X.gm;￿; p/for p D L; R. Thecentral






D .2￿ ￿ 1/U0.gm/
Increasing grants to aligned local governments unambiguously improves electoral prospects of
the R party. Increasing grants to non-aligned local governments improves electoral prospects of
the R party only if ￿ is suf￿ciently high (above 0.5) and hurts party R0s prospects if goodwill
leakage is large (￿ below 0.5). Unfortunately, ￿ is not observable. Moreover, it is likely en-
dogenous, since the central government has every incentive to make ￿ high, while non-aligned
18local governments want to keep ￿ as low as possible.
Tactical redistribution by the central incumbent is subject to two constraints. First, transfers
must satisfy an overall budget constraint. Second, the incumbent is also interested in maxi-
mizing total welfare accruing from transfers. This aspect is captured by specifying a per capita
welfare function ￿.gm/; assumed increasing and concave in gm: If voters vote along party lines,
that is, ideology of voters at the local level is the same as at the central level, it is reasonable to
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m/ D ￿ (7)
where ￿ denotes the Lagrange multiplier and g￿
m is the optimal allocation of grants for the
central incumbent R. If the objective function (5) is concave, then the necessary conditions are






The two main predictions of this model can be seen from the ￿rst-order conditions (6) and
(7). De￿ne a "swing" municipality s as one where the density of voters in the middle of the
ideology spectrum is relatively high compared to municipality l: 80
s.0/ > 80
l.0/. For "small"
levels of grants, 80
s.X.gs// > 80
s.X.gl// if gs D gl. By concavity of ￿.gm/ and U.gm/ it
follows that g￿
s > g￿
l if the ￿rst-order condition is to be satis￿ed. See ADDD (2008) Proposition
192 for a fully rigorous proof.
The second prediction can be seen by inspecting the difference in ￿rst-order conditions for
an aligned a 2 SR and a non-aligned municipality n 2 SL:
￿ 0.g￿
a/ ￿ ￿ 0.g￿
n/ D 80
n.X.g￿





When goodwill leakage is "large" .￿ < 0:5/, then the right-hand-side of this equation is
strictly negative since 80
m.X/ is assumed strictly positive for all X and so is U0.gm/ for all gm.
From the concavity assumption on ￿.gm/ it follows that g￿
a > g￿
n if the equality is to hold. That
is, the central incumbent R will allocate higher per capita grants to aligned (R) municipalities
than to those that are non-aligned (L) (ADDD 2008, Proposition 1).
4.2 Testable predictions
In this sub-section I discuss how I translate the above predictions into empirically testable hy-
potheses, given the political and institutional environment in Brazil around 1990.
Determining incumbent and opposition parties in Brazil’s fragmented party system may
seem dif￿cult at ￿rst, especially during the presidency of Fernando Collor (PRN) from 1990
until 1992, since he did not enter into formal coalitions with other parties until the end of his
term. Observers agree, however, that he needed to rely on legislative support from right-wing
parties, PDS and PFL in particular, in order to pass legislation (Ames 1995b, 2001). Other
right-wing parties at the time included the PL, the PDC and the PTB.22 As noted earlier, during
the dictatorship the system was essentially a two-party system, and right-wing parties can for
the most part be traced back to the party of the military government. Moreover, the electoral
coalitions for the 1990 race for federal deputies I observe in my data are consistent with the
de￿nition of right-wing adopted here.
Testing the ￿rst prediction also requires a measure of the proportion of non-ideological vot-
ers in each municipality. I do not have such a measure.23 Instead, I use the municipality-level
right-wing vote share￿de￿ned as the electoral support for right-wing parties in the preceding
22Partido da Reconstru￿ªo Nacional (PRN), Partido DemocrÆtico Social (PDS), Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL),
Partido Liberal (PL), Partido Democrata Cristªo (PDC), Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB).
23It is also not clear whether the central government had such a measure at the time.
20elections to the C￿mara Federal dos Deputados (the Federal Chamber of Deputies). The aver-
age right-wing vote share across municipalities is 0.5, ranging from 0.01 to 0.99. Under the
assumption that the right-wing vote share captures the ideological bias of the municipality, a
positive relationship with ￿ctitious population would indicate core-support targeting, while a
non-linear, inverted-U, relationship would be consistent with swing-voter targeting at the ex-
pense of opposition or conservative core-support municipalities. As a robustness check I also
include minor right-wing parties such as the PSD, PTR, PSC and PST for an extended de￿nition
of the right-wing vote share (see Table 3 for full party names).
The second prediction obtained above is that aligned lower level governments, that is, states
or municipalities that were governed by politicians af￿liated with the ruling coalition at the
center, were more likely to obtain population estimates above a given threshold and hence re-
ceive more federal funding than non-aligned lower level governments. In the empirical analysis
below, the binary variable right-wing governor indicates a municipality from a state where a
right-wing governor was in power from 1991 to 1994.24 Similarly, right-wing mayor indicates
a municipality headed by a mayor af￿liated with any of the above right-wing parties. Over the
1989-1992 term, right-wing mayors governed in 54% of all municipalities (Table 3).
In order to test whether legislative bargaining might explain the observed program manip-
ulation, I construct two indicator variables for municipalities with a right-wing municipality-
dominant deputy and with a non-right-wing municipality-dominant deputy, each equal to one if
a deputy vote share in the municipality exceeds a given cutoff of the total municipal vote, e.g.
50%, and zero otherwise. With a 50% cutoff, 37% of municipalities had a dominant right-wing
deputy while 11% had a dominant non-right-wing deputy (Table 3). For municipalities without
a dominant deputy, I construct two indicator variables for those with a right-wing coalition-
dominant deputy and with a non-right-wing coalition-dominant deputy, each equal to one if a
deputy vote share in the municipality exceeds a given cutoff of the total coalition vote, e.g. 50%,
and zero otherwise. Because electoral coalitions may vary by state, all dummies are calculated
24There were 13 right-wing governors and 12 non-right-wing governors elected at the end of 1990. The race for
governor of the state of Alagoas had to be repeated in early 1991. At the time the 1991 of￿cial estimates were issued in
late 1990, the party af￿liation of the governor was therefore not known and so I drop municipalities from Alagoas state
for the speci￿cations in columns 3 and 4 of Table 7.
21for each state separately.
5 Data
The data used in this study come from several sources. Of￿cial population estimates stem
from successive reports issued by the Federal Court of Accounts (Tribunal de Contas da Uniªo,
TCU). Although estimates are produced by the National Statistical Agency (Instituto Brasileiro
de Geogra￿a e Estat￿stica, IBGE), it is the responsibility of the TCU to compute municipalities’
coef￿cients kmt in accordance with decree 1881/81 (Table 1). The total number of municipali-
ties in Brazil at the end of 1990 (when the forecast for 1991 was made) was 4’490. Of these, 27
were state capitals, and for another 12 the forecast was not available, resulting in a sample size
of 4’451. 1991 census population ￿gures come from the National Statistical Agency.
Data on FPM transfers were self-reported by municipality of￿cials and compiled into reports
by the Secretariat of Economics and Finance inside the federal Ministry of Finance. The FPM
data are somewhat noisy as there is sometimes substantial under-reporting of transfers received
from the federal government. Unfortunately, more reliable data directly from the Ministry of
Finance are not available for the early nineties. The ￿nancial data were converted into 2008
currency units using the GDP de￿ator for Brazil. Electoral data for the C￿mara Federal dos
Deputados in 1990 and the municipal executive elections in 1989 are from the Supreme Elec-
toral Tribunal (Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, TSE). Again, these data are somewhat incomplete
both in terms of available variables and observations.
As discussed below, I include the following municipality characteristics from the 1980 and
1991 census as control variables: the level of municipality income per capita, average years
of schooling for individuals 25 years and older, the poverty headcount ratio, the gini index of
income inequality, and the percent of the municipal population living in urban areas. Data on
these municipality characteristics are based on the 10% and 20% samples of the 1991 census
and the 25% sample of the 1980 census and were calculated by the National Statistical Agency
(only a shorter census survey was administered to 100% of the population). Table 3 gives
descriptive statistics.
226 Estimation approach
Throughout the analysis, I will focus on the 1991 bracket error, de￿ned as 5 ￿ [k.pope
m/ ￿
k.popm/]; from Section 3 above. Speci￿cally, the dependent variable is the positive bracket
error, equaltooneifthebracketerrorispositiveandzerootherwise.25 Themethodofestimation
is OLS throughout.
To discriminate between swing voter and core-support targeting, I start out with a linear
speci￿cation in the right-wing vote share, followed by a quadratic speci￿cation, followed by
speci￿cations that add various control variables, such as polynomials in 1988 electorate and
1991 census population, state ￿xed effects, census population bracket indicators based on Table
1, and income per capita. Finally I include other municipality characteristics (average years of
schooling for individuals 25 years and older, poverty headcount ratio, gini index of income in-
equality and percent of population living in urban areas), as well as all these covariates squared.
Controlling for municipality characteristics is important because the revision of popula-
tion estimates may have been based on (local) evidence that a municipality’s actual population
placed it into higher transfer brackets. If these municipalities happened to favor right-wing
parties in previous elections for example, the correlation between right-wing support and popu-
lation estimates would be an upwardly biased measure of special-interest in￿uence. If, however,
there turns out to be a correlation between political determinants and of￿cial population esti-
mates, controlling formunicipalitycharacteristicsthatmightaccountforrevisionsofpopulation
estimates, this would be indicative of political interference.
Denoting by Yms the binary positive bracket error for municipality m in state s, and Xms the
full vector of controls mentioned above, the estimation equation is as follows:
Yms D ￿1Right-wing vote sharems C ￿2.Right-wing vote sharems/2 C ￿Xms C Ums (8)
To test whether states or municipalities that were governed by politicians af￿liated with the
ruling party at the center were more likely to be favored, I add the binary variables right-wing
25Results using the bracket error or the raw 1991 of￿cial population estimate are qualitatively similar and are available
on request.
23governor and right-wing mayor, as well interactions with the right-wing vote share. Note that
state effects and the right-wing governor indicator cannot both be included at the same time.
The full speci￿cation is:
Yms D ￿1Right-wing vote sharems (9)
C￿2.Right-wing vote sharems/2
C￿ 1Right-wing governors
C￿ 2Right-wing vote sharems ￿ Right-wing governors
C￿ 3.Right-wing vote sharems/2 ￿ Right-wing governors
C￿ 4Right-wing mayorms
C￿ 5Right-wing vote sharems ￿ Right-wing mayorms
C￿ 6.Right-wing vote sharems/2 ￿ Right-wing mayorms
C￿Xms C Ums
Totestwhetherlegislativebargainingmightexplaintheobservedprogrammanipulation, Iin-
clude the right-wing municipality-dominant deputy and non-right-wing municipality-dominant
deputy dummies, as well as those for a right-wing coalition-dominant deputy and a non-right-
wing coalition-dominant deputy. When all dummies are included, the omitted category are
municipalities where no deputy dominated the municipality or coalition vote. The full speci￿-
cation is:




C￿3.1 ￿ Municipality-dominant deputyms/ ￿ Right-wing coalition-dominant deputyms
C￿4.1 ￿ Municipality-dominant deputyms/ ￿ Non-right-wing coalition-dominant deputyms
C￿Xms C Ums
24There might also have been more subtle manipulations of the program prior to 1991, which
left the distribution of population estimates smooth at the cutoffs. Unfortunately, electoral data
for the 1987-1990 congressional session, the ￿rst under the new democratic regime, is not
readily available. Instead, I use data from 1985, the last year of the military government, to
run the exact same tests as discussed above. The only right-wing parties in this period were the
PDS (the party of the military regime) and the (very minor) PTB. The right-wing vote share in
this period is based on the municipality-level vote for right-wing parties in the 1982 elections to
the C￿mara Federal dos Deputados. To test whether there is evidence of political interference
in this period I use speci￿cation (8) above.
7 Estimation results
Table 4 presents estimates of ￿1 and ￿2 based on equation (8). The results provide clear statis-
tical evidence of a non-linear relationship between the right-wing vote share and the probability
of obtaining a ￿ctitious population boost, irrespective of the control variables that are included.
Figure 5 plots the quadratic ￿t from Table 4, column (1), along with the sample proportion
of municipalities with a positive 1991 bracket error in each of 25 non-overlapping bins that
partition the support of the right-wing vote share. For opposition municipalities￿those with a
right-wing vote share close to zero￿the probability of a favorable population estimate is about
0.32. As the right-wing vote share increases, so does this probability, until it peaks at about 0.48
(at a right-wing vote share of 0.56). The probability then falls back to a level of about 0.40 for
conservative core-support municipalities (right-wing vote share of 1.00).26
Table 5 reports estimates of ￿1 and ￿2 based on equation (8) using an extended de￿nition
of the right-wing vote share, including minor right-wing parties. Again, the estimates provide
clear statistical evidence of a non-linear relationship between the right-wing vote share and the
probabilityofobtaining anoverlyfavorabletransferbracket, irrespectiveofthecontrolvariables
that are included. As an additional robustness check, I also use a restricted de￿nition of the
right-wing vote, excluding the party of the president, the PRN. Again, results (not shown) are
26Going from a right-wing vote share of 0 to 0.56 increases the estimated probability of a positive bracket error by:
0:58 ￿ 0:56 ￿ 0:51 ￿ 0:562 D 0:165.
25quantitatively similar to those in Tables 4 and 5. The key result is therefore that municipalities
with roughly equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares bene￿ted relative to opposition
or conservative core-support municipalities, which is consistent with swing-voter targeting by
the right-wing central government.
In sharp contrast to the clear evidence of special-interest politics in the 1991 of￿cial esti-
mates, there is no evidence of similar interference in the 1985 of￿cial estimates. Table 6 shows
estimation results for the binary positive 1985 bracket error as the dependent variable based on
equation (8). While the estimates of ￿1 and ￿2 in the the ￿rst two columns indicate swing-voter
targeting, adding population controls eliminates this "effect". The evidence thus suggests that,
although the grand redistribution scheme discussed here was shielded from tactical redistribu-
tion during the dictatorship, the same program became subject to special-interest politics after
the transition to democracy.
Table 7 reports estimates of ￿1, ￿2, and all the ￿ 0s based on equation (9). The ￿rst column
replicates the results from Table 4, column 8 above. Column 2 drops the state effects and
results remain essentially unchanged. Column 3 adds the right-wing governor indicator and its
interactions with the right-wing vote share and the squared right-wing vote share. The point
estimates on these interactions suggest that swing-voter targeting was in fact driven entirely by
states with non-right-wing governors. Among aligned states, there is no statistical evidence of
core-support or swing-voter targeting.27 Although the estimates imply that the two conditional
expectation functions are quite different, statistically, the evidence against a common strategy
across states .H0 : ￿ 1 C ￿ 2 C ￿ 3 D 0/ is not very strong .p-value D 0:176/.
Column 4 of Table 7 shows that a similar pattern emerges when the right-wing mayor in-
dicator and interactions with the right-wing vote share and the squared right-wing vote share
are included. The point estimates on these interactions suggest that swing-voter targeting was
driven mostly by municipalities with non-right-wing mayors. Among municipalities with right-
wing mayors, there is some evidence of swing-voter targeting, although the estimate of ￿2C￿ 6
is not signi￿cantly different from zero.28 Figure 6 illustrates these results. For municipalities
27b ￿1 Cb ￿ 2 D ￿0:019; se.b ￿1 Cb ￿ 2/ D 0:307I b ￿2 Cb ￿ 3 D 0:063; se.b ￿2 Cb ￿ 3/ D 0:266: For the joint null hypotheses
H0 : ￿1 C ￿ 2 D 0 and ￿2 C ￿ 3 D 0 the F-statistic and [p-value] are: 0.39, [0.677].
28b ￿1 Cb ￿ 5 D 0:260; se.b ￿1 Cb ￿ 5/ D 0:199I b ￿2 Cb ￿ 6 D ￿:189; se.b ￿2 Cb ￿ 6/ D 0:198: For the joint null hypotheses
26withnon-right-wing mayors, theprobabilityof afavorablepopulationestimate startsfromabout
0.28 for opposition municipalities, peaks at about 0.50, when right-wing and non-right-wing
vote shares are about equal (0.525 to be precise), and falls back to about 0.30 for conservative
core-support municipalities (right-wing vote share of 1.00).29
While these estimates imply that the conditional expectation functions are quite different
depending on mayors’ and governors’ alignment with the central government, statistically, the
evidence against a common strategy across states .H0 : ￿ 1 C ￿ 2 C ￿ 3 D 0/, municipalities
.H0 : ￿ 4 C ￿ 5 C ￿ 6 D 0/; or both, is not very strong .p-valuesD 0:437;0:136;0:138/, respec-
tively. Only when state effects are included in column 5 can the equality of conditional expec-
tation functions across municipalities with right-wing and non-right-wing mayors be rejected at
the 10% level .p-valueD 0:056/: Overall, this pattern of results suggests that the conservative
central government was attempting to bring non-ideological voters in non-aligned lower-level
governments￿municipalities in particular￿into the fold.30
Table 8 reports estimates of ￿1, ￿2, and all the ￿0s based on equation (10). The ￿rst column
replicates the results from Table 4, column 8 above. Columns 2 to 5 use a 0.5 cutoff to determine
whether a deputy is considered dominant in a given municipality, and different cutoffs￿ranging
from 0.5 to 0.8￿to determine coalition dominance among municipalities without a dominant
deputy. Columns 6 to 9 use cutoffs ranging from 0.5 to 0.8 to determine whether a deputy is
considered dominant in a given municipality, and a ￿xed cutoff of 0.5 to determine coalition
dominance among municipalities without a dominant deputy. The ￿rst result that stands out in
Table 8 is that including the dominant deputy dummies does not alter the estimates of ￿1and
￿2. Second, the estimates of ￿1 and ￿2 in columns 3 to 7 suggest that municipalities with
a municipality-dominant deputy (right-wight or non-right-wing) were about 4 to 7 percentage
points less likely to receive overly favorable population estimates compared to communities
where no deputy dominated the municipality or coalition vote. In columns 4 to 6 there is also
H0 : ￿1 C ￿ 5 D 0 and ￿2 C ￿ 6 D 0 the F-statistic and [p-value] are: 1.73, [0.177].
29Going from a right-wing vote share of 0 to 0.525 increases the estimated probability of a positive bracket error by:
0:84 ￿ 0:525 ￿ 0:79 ￿ 0:5252 D 0:22.
30As is evident from Table 7 and Figure 6, among core opposition municipalities (right-wing vote share = 0), those
with right-wing mayors had a 10 percentage points higher chance to get favorable treatment. Among core support
municipalities (right-wing vote share = 1.00) those with right-wing mayors had a 13 to 17 percentage points higher
chance to get favorable treatment based on estimates in columns 4 and 5.
27some evidence against the joint null hypotheses that all municipality- and coalition-dominant
deputy dummies are zero .H0 : ￿1 C ￿2 C ￿3 C ￿4 D 0/ since p-values are below 0.10.
8 Conclusion
This paper documents that even a rules-based transfer program anchored in the constitution
and in the national tax code￿as opposed to programs funded through the annual budget￿and
based on apparently technocratic inputs is not always immune to special-interest politics. The
analysis suggest that over the decade of the 1990s, FPM revenue-sharing transfers were targeted
at municipalities with roughly equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares at the expense
of opposition or conservative core-support municipalities. In addition, there is some evidence
that is consistent with legislative coalition-building by the central government executive. In
contrast, there is no evidence of swing- or core-voter targeting in the last population estimates
made under the military government that had set up the revenue-sharing mechanism in 1965.
Additional explanations for the program manipulation are of course possible. For example,
bureaucrats may have simply bumped up those municipalities that paid the highest bribes. This
type of corruption would be exceedingly hard to detect in the data. It is also conceivable that
favored municipalities were part of in￿uential federal politicians’ networks. In exchange for
funds transferred under the FPM, federal politicians likely received monetary kickbacks, which
they used to ￿nance their campaign spending and cultivate their personal vote. Municipalities
thatareinthenetworkarenotnecessarilythemunicipalitiesthatprovidedmostelectoralsupport
for federal politicians, however, which makes this type of special-interest politics dif￿cult to
detect (Samuels 2002).
Nonetheless, the results presented here do suggest that the exclusive focus on discretionary
transfers in the extant empirical literature on special-interest politics may understate the true
scope of tactical redistribution that is going on under programmatic disguise. Investigation of
other seemingly special-interest-proof programs, including direct transfer programs to individ-
uals as in Camacho and Conover (2011), is thus an obvious avenue for future research.
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31Table 1: Brackets and coef￿cients for the FPM transfer
Population bracket Coefficient
up to 10’ 188 0.6
from 10’ 189 to 13’ 584 0.8
from 13’ 585 to 16’ 980 1
from 16’ 981 to 23’ 772 1.2
from 23’ 773 to 30’ 564 1.4
from 30’ 565 to 37’ 356 1.6
from 37’ 357 to 44’ 148 1.8
from 44’ 149 to 50’ 940 2
from 50’ 941 to 61’ 128 2.2
from 61’ 129 to 71’ 316 2.4
from 71’ 317 to 81’ 504 2.6
from 81’ 505 to 91’ 692 2.8
from 91’ 693 to 101’ 880 3
from 101’ 881 to 115’ 464 3.2
from 115’ 465 to 129’ 048 3.4
from 129’ 049 to 142’ 632 3.6
from 142’ 633 to 156’ 216 3.8
above 156’ 216 4
Source: Decree 1881/81
32Table 2: Bracket error distribution
Panel A, bunched municipalities
1989 official population classification
Panel B, bunched municipalities
1991 official population classification
Bracket error Freq. Percent Cum. Bracket error Freq. Percent Cum.
-6 2 0.11 0.11 -6 0 0.00    0.00
-5 7 0.38 0.48 -5 0 0.00    0.00
-4 6 0.32 0.80 -4 2 0.11 0.11
-3 14 0.75 1.56 -3 2 0.11 0.21
-2 49 2.63 4.18 -2 5 0.27 0.48
-1 301 16.15 20.33 -1 38 2.04 2.52
0 911 48.87 69.21 0 318 17.06 19.58
1 387 20.76 89.97 1 1051 56.38 75.97
2 132 7.08 97.05 2 333 17.86 93.83
3 36 1.93 98.98 3 76 4.08 97.91
4 15 0.80 99.79 4 24 1.29 99.20
5 3 0.16 99.95 5 11 0.59 99.79
6 1 0.05 100.00 6  3 0.16 99.95
7 1 0.05 100.00
Panel C, non-bunched municipalities
1989 official population classification
Panel D, non-bunched municipalities
1991 official population classification
Bracket error Freq. Percent Cum. Bracket error Freq. Percent     Cum.
-7 1 0.04 0.04 -7 0 0.00 0.00
-6 1 0.04 0.08 -6 1 0.04 0.04
-4 3 0.12 0.20 -5 0 0.04 0.04
-3 4 0.16 0.36 -3 3 0.12 0.16
-2 33 1.34 1.70 -2 9 0.36 0.53
-1 200 8.10 9.81 -1 43 1.74 2.72
0 1976 80.06 89.87 0 1941 78.65 80.92
1 212 8.59 98.46 1 404 16.37 97.29
2 29 1.18 99.64 2 45 1.82 99.11
3 6 0.24 99.88 3 16 0.65 99.76
4 2 0.08 99.96 4 5 0.20 99.96
5 0 0.00   99.96 5      1      0.04      100.00
9 1 0.04      100.00
Notes: The total number of municipalities in Panel s A and B is 1864 and in Panels C and D the
total number is 2468. Bunched municipalities refers to those located on any of the bunching points
identified in the main text. The tabulation excludes 119 municipalities that were created between
1989  and  1991 . Bracket error  is  defined  as   5× [k(19XX official population) – k(1991 census
population)], where k(.) is the step function defined in decree 1881/81 and XX=89,91.
33Table 3: Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. D. Min Max
Population data (IBGE)
1991 official population ('000) 4'451 26.89 50.49 0.20 1'246.8
1991 census population ('000) 4'451 24.32 48.83 0.75 846.4
1991 bracket error using 1991 official population 4'451 0.57 0.89 -6 7
1991 bracket error using 1989 official population 4'332 0.07 0.9 -7 9
1991 bunch status (0/1) 4'451 0.42 0.49 0 1
1985 official population ('000) 3'942 22.60 42.54 0.10 1'094.8
1985 interpolated population ('000) 3'942 24.05 47.56 0.78 1'186.9
1985 bracket error 3'942 -0.10 0.76 -9 8
1980 census population ('000) 3'887 23.01 43.11 0.73 1'094.8
Elections data (supreme electoral tribunal)
1990 right-wing vote share 3'757 0.49 0.23 0.01 0.99
1990 right-wing vote share (incl. minor) 3'757 0.52 0.23 0.02 1.00
1990 right-wing vote share (excl. PRN) 3'757 0.38 0.22 0.00 0.98
1990 right-wing municipality-dominant deputy (>0.50) 3'686 0.37 0.48 0 1
1990 non-right-wing municipality-dominant deputy (>0.50) 3'686 0.11 0.31 0 1
1989 right-wing mayor  (0/1) 4'276 0.54 0.49 0 1
1988 electorate ('000) 4'442 13.6 27.08 0 493.8
1982 right-wing vote share 4'086 0.62 0.23 0.03 1.00
Municipality characteristics (census)
1991 income per capita (% of minimum salary) 4'450 0.72 0.42 0.14 3.48
1991 average years of schooling (25 years and older) 4'451 3.15 1.22 0.34 8.84
1991 poverty headcount ratio (national poverty line, %) 4'450 62.9 21.74 4.83 98.9
1991 gini index of income inequality 4'451 0.53 0.05 0.35 0.79
1991 population living in urban areas (%) 4'450 0.52 0.23 0.02 1.00
1980 income per capita (% of minimum salary) 3'990 0.82 0.46 0.06 3.57
1980 average years of schooling (25 years and older) 3'990 2.08 1.07 0.1 7.2
1980 poverty headcount ratio (national poverty line, %) 3'990 56.3 22.7 1.69 97.9
1980 population living in urban areas (%) 3'950 0.32 0.21 0.00 1.00
Notes: Right-wing consists of the following political parties: Partido da Frente Liberal (PFL), Partido
Democrático Social (PDS), Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro (PTB), Partido Democrata Cristão (PDC),
Partido Liberal (PL), Partido da Reconstrução Nacional (PRN). Minor right-wing parties include:
Partido Social Democrático (PSD), Partido Trabalhista Renovador (PTR), Partido Social Cristão (PSC),






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































37Table7: Positivebracketerrorandright-wingvoteshare, governors, andmayors
Dependent variable: positive 1991 bracket error (0/1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Right-wing vote share 0.469*** 0.431*** 0.581*** 0.842*** 0.758***
(0.134) (0.126) (0.146) (0.198) (0.195)
(Right-wing vote share)
2 -0.430*** -0.357*** -0.521*** -0.791*** -0.765***
(0.129) (0.124) (0.149) (0.201) (0.195)
Right-wing governor (0/1) 0.144 0.131
(0.088) (0.091)
Right-wing vote share· -0.599* -0.480
Right-wing governor (0/1) (0.343) (0.356)
(Right-wing vote share)
2· 0.584* 0.426
Right-wing governor (0/1) (0.306) (0.320)
Right-wing mayor (0/1) 0.107* 0.106*
(0.059) (0.058)
Right-wing vote share· -0.582** -0.567**
Right-wing mayor (0/1) (0.260) (0.253)
(Right-wing vote share)
2· 0.602** 0.629**
Right-wing mayor (0/1) (0.257) (0.250)
State fixed effects Y N N N Y
F-statistics and [p-values]
Right-wing governor indicator and all





Right-wing mayor indicator and all





Right-wing governor and mayor
indicators and all interactions zero
H0: 123456 0 gggggg ======
1.62
[0.138]
Observations 3706 3706 3610 3467 3563
R-squared 0.350 0.322 0.323 0.342 0.367
Notes: OLS estimations. 1991 bracket  error is defined as 5·[k(1991 official population)–  k(1991 census
population)], where k(.) is the step function defined in decree 1881/81.  Right-wing vote share is from the 1990
elections for the Câmara Federal dos Deputados  and includes the following political parties: PFL, PDS, PTB,
PDC, PL and PRN. Right-wing governor refers to the 1991-1994 term. Right-wing mayor refers to the 1989-
1992 term. All regressions  include populationcontrols, census  population  bracket indicator s,  income  per
capita, as well as other municipality characteristics , as listed in Table4. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard
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